THE CASE FOR MANAGED JUDGES: LEARNING FROM JAPAN
AFTER THE POLITICAL UPHEAVAL OF 1993
†

J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN

The Chief Justice of the United States supervises a vast judicial bureaucracy. He is the titular head of the judicial branch: 1200 judges
with life tenure, 850 magistrate and bankruptcy judges, and 30,000
administrative staff members. The careers he can affect most are
those of his administrative employees. Even the life-tenured judges,
however, he can appoint to specialized judicial bodies. In doing all
this, he supervises the Federal Judicial Conference with a budget of
1
$5.4 billion.
If the Chief Justice of the United States does much, his counterpart in Japan does much more. Not only does the Japanese Chief Justice supervise administrative employees, he also supervises the judicial
personnel office called the Secretariat. In turn, the judges in the Secretariat control the jobs of the 3000 other national judges who de2
cide cases. The American Chief Justice does not tell lower-court
3
judges where to sit. Through the Secretariat, however, the Japanese
Chief Justice does. The American Chief Justice does not decide how
much the lower-court judges earn. Through the Secretariat, the Japanese Chief Justice does. Effectively, the Japanese Chief Justice exercises power over the career of every lower-court judge. All this he
does as an appointee of a distinctly political Prime Minister.
This is not an institutional structure likely to foster judicial independence. Nor, over the four decades during which the Liberal De-
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mocratic Party (LDP) was in power, did the Party care to foster independence. Instead, the Chief Justices supervised the courts in ways
that furthered the electoral interests of the LDP. Over time, litigants
allied with opposition parties filed a variety of politically sensitive legal
challenges. When judges decided cases along the lines the opposition
wanted, they tended to suffer in their career.
The LDP temporarily lost power in 1993, and politicians from
other parties took control. Although the LDP reclaimed the government in 1996, it had lost its electoral lock and now needed to consider
the possibility that it might again find itself in the opposition.
Throughout the ensuing instability, however, the courts retained their
tightly controlled, conservative structure.
Smarter and harderworking judges did better than the (relatively) dull and indolent.
Those who served as loyal “organization men” did better than renegades who had allied themselves with the Left.
Both in Japan and in the United States, university professors and
bar activists routinely express dismay at court systems so susceptible to
control from the top. Yet their dismay misses much of the point. In
Japan, these incentives place judges within a brutally competitive internal labor market. Through the resulting incentives, the Chief Justice effectively imposes on the judges stringent, uniform standards.
That uniformity, in turn, enables potential litigants to settle their disputes out of court by using the expected litigated outcome as a guide
to settlement.
Through its “managed judges,” in other words, Japan maintains a
system that lets people resolve their disputes by uniform and predictable legal standards. The standards remain uniform and predictable
because the judges who impose them have far more incentives than
American judges to keep them that way. That predictability, in turn,
creates less need for lawyers to discover and argue the law and lets
people in Japan use law and courts with far fewer lawyers than people
in the United States. Through these incentives, in short, Japan has
slashed the transaction costs that American lawyers, juries, and judges
magnify so remorselessly.
The political costs to Japan of having “managed judges” are trivial.
The vast majority of court cases involve no issues of political moment.
Whether in Japan or in the United States, most legal disputes instead
concern such things as traffic accidents and debt collection. What is
more, before 1993, the LDP was the majority party. Thus, even in
those rare political cases when judges furthered LDP electoral inter-
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ests, usually the judges just gave Japanese voters what they wanted
from their government.
In this Article, we detail the structure of the Japanese courts and
use statistical analysis to see if the promotion structure changed after
the LDP lost power in 1993. We start, in Part I.A, by laying out the institutional structure and explaining where political influence did or
did not enter into the judiciary before 1993. We then describe, in
Part I.B, the events of 1993 and how they might have affected the behavior of the courts. Next, in Part I.C, we look quantitatively at both
the Supreme Court and the lower courts to see what actually happened after 1993. We conclude, in Part II, with a summary and fuller
discussion—necessarily more speculative than the rest of the paper—
of the advantages and disadvantages of the Japanese system of managed judges.
I. STRUCTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. The Pre-1993 Tradition

4

1. Institutional Structure
a. The Secretariat
At the apex of the Japanese judiciary stands the Chief Justice of
the fifteen-member Supreme Court. Appointed by the Prime Minister, he participates in judicial decision making. He also presides over
the Judicial Conference, which includes meetings of the justices of the
Supreme Court on matters of rulemaking and judicial administration.
And he runs the court’s administrative office, the Secretariat.

4

We base this discussion on our earlier work, which began with a series of articles.
See generally J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331 (2001); J. Mark Ramseyer &
Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53
(2001); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, Skewed Incentives: Paying for Politics as a
Japanese Judge, 83 JUDICATURE 190 (2000); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why
the Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 571 (1999); J. Mark Ramseyer &
Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan, 13
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997). We then compiled this material into a book: J. MARK
RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003) [hereinafter RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN].
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Table 1: Appointments to the Supreme Court, 1973-2003:
5
Selected Statistics
A. Justices appointed

B. Chief Justices appointed

82

7

C. Mean age of appointment of Justices
1973-1982

63.8

1983-1992

64.3

1993-1997

64.0

1998-2002

64.0

D. Percent of Justices appointed from the lower courts
1973-1982

42

1983-1992

42

1993-1997

29

1998-2002

36

E. Percent of Justices appointed from the bar
1973-1982

35

1983-1992

31

1993-1997

29

1998-2002

29

5

ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN [OVERVIEW OF CAREERS OF ALL JAPANESE JUDGES]
(Nihon minshu horitsuka kyokai [Japan Democratic Lawyers’ Ass’n] ed., 4 ban [4th
ed.] 2004).
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Table 2: Appointments to the Supreme Court, 1983-2005
Prime
Minister

Justice

Born

App.

Apprx
Age

Prior Job

Nakasone

Tsunoda

1920

1983

63

bureaucrat

Nakasone

Takashima

1919

1984

65

bureaucrat

Nakasone

Yaguchi

1920

1984

64

judge

Nakasone

Shimatani

1920

1984

64

lawyer

Nakasone

Nagashima

1918

1984

66

prosecutor

Nakasone

Oouchi

1922

1985

63

judge

Nakasone

Fujishima

1924

1985

61

prosecutor

Nakasone

Kagawa

1921

1986

65

judge

Nakasone

Sato

1920

1986

66

lawyer

Nakasone

Sakaue

1923

1986

63

lawyer

Nakasone

Hayashi

1923

1986

63

lawyer

Nakasone

Yotsuya

1922

1987

65

judge

Nakasone

Okuno

1920

1987

67

lawyer

Takeshita

Teika

1923

1988

65

judge

Chief
Justice

Secretariat

SecretaryGeneral

yes

yes

yes

no

yes

yes

no

no

no

no

yes

yes

no

no

no

Takeshita

Oohori

1925

1988

63

prosecutor

Kaifu

Sonobe

1929

1989

60

judge

no

no

no

Kaifu

Kusaba

1925

1989

64

judge

yes

yes

yes

Kaifu

Mimura

1924

1990

66

bureaucrat

Kaifu

Nakajima

1925

1990

65

bureaucrat

Kaifu

Kabe

1927

1990

63

judge

no

yes

yes

Kaifu

Hashimoto

1922

1990

68

lawyer

Kaifu

Sato

1924

1990

66

lawyer

Kaifu

Kizaki

1924

1990

66

lawyer

Miyazawa

Oonishi

1928

1991

63

judge

no

yes

yes

Miyazawa

Ono

1930

1992

62

judge

no

yes

no

Miyazawa

Miyoshi

1927

1992

65

judge

yes

yes

no

Miyazawa

Oono

1927

1993

66

lawyer

no

yes

yes

Miyazawa

Ooshiro

na

1993

na

lawyer

Hosokawa

Chigusa

1932

1993

61

judge

Hosokawa

Takahashi

1927

1994

67

bureaucrat

Hosokawa

Ozaki

1929

1994

65

lawyer

Hosokawa

Negishi

1928

1994

66

prosecutor

Murayama

Kawai

1932

1994

62

lawyer

6

6

ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN, supra note 5; Supreme Court of Japan, http://
courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/home.nsf/ehome?OpenPage. The 2005 Court is in italics.
Chief Justices are in boldface. Koizumi’s first eight appointments (a Court majority)
are between horizontal lines. The last column indicates whether the justice had been
secretary-general of the secretariat.
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Table 2 (cont’d): Appointments to the Supreme Court, 1983-2005
Prime
Minister

Justice

Born

App.

Apprx
Age

Prior Job

Murayama

Fukuda

1935

1995

60

Murayama

Fujii

1932

1995

63

judge

Murayama

Endo

1930

1995

65

lawyer

Murayama

Ijima

1932

1995

63

prosecutor

Chief
Justice

Secretariat

SecretaryGeneral

bureaucrat
no

no

no

Murayama

Fukuda

1935

1995

60

bureaucrat

Hashimoto

Oode

1932

1997

65

bureaucrat

Hashimoto

Kanatani
Yamaguchi
Motohara

1935

1997

62

judge

no

yes

yes

1932

1997

65

judge

yes

yes

yes

no

yes

no

yes

yes

no

no

Hashimoto
Hashimoto

1931

1997

66

lawyer

1934

1998

64

judge

Obuchi

Kitagawa
Kameya
ma

1934

1998

64

prosecutor

Obuchi

Kajitani

1935

1999

64

lawyer

Obuchi

Okuda

1932

1999

67

professor

Obuchi

Machida

1936

2000

64

judge

Mori

Fukazawa

1934

2000

66

lawyer

Koizumi

Yokoo

1941

2001

60

bureaucrat

Koizumi

Hamada

1936

2001

65

lawyer

Koizumi

Ueda

1937

2002

65

judge

no

yes

Koizumi

Shimada

1938

2002

64

judge

no

yes

no

Koizumi

Izumi

1939

2002

63

judge

no

yes

yes

Koizumi

Takii

1936

2002

66

lawyer

Koizumi

Fujita

1940

2002

62

professor

Koizumi

Kainaka

1940

2002

62

prosecutor

Koizumi

Tsuno

1938

2004

66

bureaucrat

Koizumi

Saiguchi

1938

2004

66

lawyer

Koizumi

Imai

1939

2004

65

judge

yes

no

Koizumi

Nakagawa

1939

2005

66

lawyer

Koizumi

Horigome

1940

2005

65

judge

yes

yes

Koizumi

Furuta

1942

2005

63

prosecutor

Obuchi

In administering the Secretariat, the Chief Justice runs an institution he knows well, especially compared to most of his fellow justices.
From 1973 to 2003, a plurality of the eighty-two Supreme Court appointees had been career judges before joining the Court, but a majority had not. During the same period, every Chief Justice had been
a career lower-court judge. Of the five Chief Justices appointed since
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1983 (we lack career data on the earlier justices), each had worked in
the Secretariat himself while a lower-court judge. Three of the five
7
had even headed it as the Secretary General. If we look beyond just
the Chief Justice to all twenty post-1983 justices appointed from the
lower courts, we find seven who had earlier served as Secretary General of the Secretariat, and another nine who had worked there in
8
other capacities. Only four had never worked in the Secretariat.
Justices appointed from positions outside the court system would,
of course, lack such experience and therefore have less power over
the careers of lower-court judges. These include university professors,
prosecutors, lawyers in private practice, and twelve bureaucrats. Of
the last group, five had headed the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, five
were former diplomats, one came from the ministry of Labor, and one
9
from Health and Welfare.
Like other Supreme Court justices, the Chief Justice serves until
10
mandatory retirement at age seventy.
In theory, voters can recall
him and his Supreme Court colleagues at a general parliamentary
11
election. In practice, they do not, and have never even come close.
The justices’ jobs are secure.
Not so the jobs of lower-court judges. To Japanese judges, the Secretariat represents what the Vatican is to ambitious Catholic priests:
the ultimate locus of control over their careers. Japanese judges join
the court young. Rather than being appointed in mid-career as in the
United States, they join right after completing their legal training at
the national law school, the Legal Research and Training Institute
(LRTI). Because for years the Institute entrance exam had a one to
three percent pass rate (it is higher today), most judges flunked it sev12
eral times before starting the LRTI.
As a result, by the time they
joined the court, most were in their late twenties.

7

See supra tables 1, 2.
Here and elsewhere, we obtain our data on the Japanese judiciary from ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN, supra note 5.
9
John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public Trust 9-10 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis School of Law, Faculty Working Papers Series,
No. 05-10-01, 2005), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=821466.
10
See Saibansho ho [Courts Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, § 50, translated in 2 EHS LAW
BULL. SER. no. 2010 (2005) (“Justices of the Supreme Court shall retire upon the attainment of seventy years of age . . . .”).
11
See J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN’S POLITICAL
MARKETPLACE 152-53 (rev. ed. 1997) (describing Japanese recall practice).
12
See infra table 3, panel D.
8
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Table 3: Lower-Court Judges Appointed in
13
1968, 1978, 1988, and 1998: Selected Statistics
A. Number appointed
Class of 1968
Class of 1978
Class of 1988
Class of 1998

86 (93% male)
82 (93% male)
79 (91% male)
94 (81% male)

B. Percent University of Tokyo graduates
Class of 1968
Class of 1978
Class of 1988
Class of 1998

29.1
17.1
20.3
17.0

C. Percent University of Kyoto graduates
Class of 1968
Class of 1978
Class of 1988
Class of 1998

10.5
13.4
2.5
0.0

D. Mean times flunking the LRTI entrance exam
Class of 1968
Class of 1978
Class of 1988
Class of 1998

4.4
4.6
4.9
3.5

E. Percent appointed initially to the Tokyo District Court
Class of 1968
Class of 1978
Class of 1988
Class of 1998

18.8
19.2
31.5
30.1

F. Percent appointed initially to branch office or summary court
Class of 1968
Class of 1978
Class of 1988
Class of 1998

12.9
2.6
0.0
0.0

G. Percent members of the Young Jurists League
Class of 1968
Class of 1978
Class of 1988
Class of 1998

11.6
0.0
0.0
0.0

Lower-court judges serve a series of ten-year terms. Although the
Secretariat can choose not to reappoint them at the end of each term,

13

ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN, supra note 5; OSORUBEKI SAIBAN [FEARSOME TRIALS] (Shiso undo kenkyu sho ed., 1969); GAKUSHIKAI, KAIINSHI MEIROKU: HEISEI 10
NEN YO [MEMBERSHIP ROSTER: FOR 1998 USE] (1997).

2006]

THE CASE FOR MANAGED JUDGES

1887

it almost invariably does. Judges face mandatory retirement at age
14
sixty-five, but most retire at about sixty.
Judges sit where the Secretariat tells them to sit. Ostensibly to
train the young judges, to avoid corruption, and to equalize the quality of provincial courts, the Secretariat moves judges from post to post
at regular intervals, typically of three years. These moves can be, and
often are, from one end of Japan to the other, and from trial courts to
appellate courts and back again. The Secretariat also decides lowercourt judges’ pay via promotions. Although the Constitution does
protect judges against pay cuts, it does not promise them pay raises.
Judicial salaries range widely, and the Secretariat decides how fast a
15
judge’s salary climbs the scale.
The Supreme Court also differs from lower courts in how readily
the heterodox can express their views. By law, each Supreme Court
16
justice must give his own opinion in a Supreme Court case. Hence,
published cases include dissenting opinions as well as majority opinions and dissenting votes. In the lower courts, dissenting judges on a
panel do not publish separate opinions. They therefore cannot try to
express their views and modify the law by the eloquent presentation of
their arguments.
b. The Hierarchy of Posts
Not all posts are created equal. Usually, a judge wants a job in one
of the major metropolitan areas, and in Tokyo if possible. American
visitors may delight in the mountain towns and seaside villages of the
Japanese countryside, but ambitious Japanese professionals stick to
Tokyo. Tokyo houses the national government, as well as the Supreme Court and the Secretariat. It represents the locus of the opposition parties and contains most of the professional, civic, and nonprofit organizations. It houses the headquarters of most large
corporations. It is the site of the best universities. And crucially for
professionals with families, it has most of the best preparatory schools.
Judges also want judgeships with administrative power. After
about twenty-two years, they can expect a “sokatsu” posting—a judge-

14

See RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 11, at 154 (discussing retirement practice); id. at 156, 165 (describing the circumstances of several non-reappointment incidents).
15
See id. at 155 (noting variation in the Japanese pay scale); RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 4, at 37-43 (detailing determinants of pay).
16
Courts Act § 11.
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ship with personnel responsibilities over their local court. Before retiring, some can expect to serve as a District Court Chief Judge. And
the most successful will become Chief Judge of one of the seven High
18
Courts (the appellate courts).
Most judges covet certain nonjudicial jobs as well. Perhaps the
most prestigious such posting is to the Secretariat itself. There, judges
may handle personnel rotations, set court policy, or write rough drafts
of Supreme Court opinions. Other judges may work at a prosecutorial
office. They may teach future lawyers and judges at the LRTI. Or
they might spend a few years at the Civil Affairs Bureau of the Ministry
of Justice.
The same ambitious judges will shun the family courts, summary
courts, and judicial branch offices when they can. Branch offices tend
to be in the smaller cities and have only one or a very few judges.
Even promising judges will spend some time in a branch office, but
fast-track judges will have fewer such rotations than others. Summary
courts (i.e., small claims courts) represent a separate structure entirely, and most summary court judges are not part of the judicial hierarchy at all. Still, a standard judge on a slow track can occasionally
find himself exiled to summary court duty for several years.
Reflecting the prestige of Tokyo posts, the Secretariat every year
chooses from its new recruits the most promising and names them to
19
the Tokyo District Court (TDC). Typically, that appointment places
such judges on a fast track. Should they work shrewdly and prudently,
they will earn more rotations through prestigious posts (and fewer in
branch offices) than their colleagues for the rest of their career. The
Secretariat also determines which new judges are least promising, and
until recently (a recent change in policy) named them to an initial
20
appointment at a branch office or summary court.
Take the career of a fairly successful judge, Keiichi Konagamitsu.
A native of the southern provincial city of Fukuoka, Konagamitsu attended the prestigious University of Kyoto, typically ranked second
21
only to the University of Tokyo.
He graduated from the LRTI in

17

See RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 4, at 40 tbl.2.5 (noting the mean number
of years to sokatsu).
18
See RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 11, at 166 tbl.9.2 (describing the highest career positions attained by a particular graduating class).
19
See supra table 3, panel E.
20
See supra table 3, panel F.
21
See supra table 3, panels B & C (noting the higher percentage of Tokyo graduates with appointments than Kyoto graduates).
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1965, and went to work at the district court in the urban center of
Okayama. Given that he was born in 1936, he probably graduated
from the university in 1958. Since he entered the LRTI in 1963, it
22
would appear he failed the LRTI entrance exam five times.
Konagamitsu’s first rotation after his three years in Okayama took
him to the TDC. Another three years there, and he went to provincial
Niigata. After yet another three years, he returned to Tokyo, and four
years later (at age forty-two) moved to his home of Fukuoka. Other
than a few years teaching at the Tokyo-based LRTI, he spent most of
the rest of his career in Fukuoka. After serving as Chief Judge of the
Fukuoka District Court for eighteen months, he retired in 2001 at age
sixty-five.
Over this elaborate hierarchy of judicial appointments presides
the Chief Justice. He supervises the Secretary General of the Secretariat. The Secretary General is himself on a fast track and may join
the Supreme Court within a few years. He supervises the judges staffing the Secretariat, and those Secretariat judges monitor the performance of the rest. They decide who will move where at the end of each
three-year stint and how quickly to promote each judge on the pay
scale.
2. Implementation

23

During most of the post-war years, the Secretariat moved judges
neither uniformly nor randomly. Instead, it promoted the talented
more quickly than the dull, and the industrious more quickly than the
indolent (if we may use such terms comparatively—all who pass the
LRTI examination form a relatively elite group). Through a series of
22

For a comparison of failure rates in other graduating classes, see supra table 3,
panel D.
23
The discussion in Parts II and III is based on RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note
4. For two spirited responses to this empirical work, see generally John O. Haley, Book
Review, 30 J. JAPANESE STUD. 235 (2004); Haley, supra note 9. See also John O. Haley,
Judicial Independence in Japan Revisited, 25 LAW JAPAN 1, 8-14 (1995) (discussing judicial independence among career judges in Japan). Frank Upham’s summary and
critique of the exchange appears in Frank K. Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful Public
Servants: Two Views of the Japanese Judiciary, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 421 (2005).
As we understand Haley’s views, he does not contest our description of the institutional framework, he does not dispute the way that the Secretariat has enforced it in
the apolitical context, nor does he object to our characterization of the outcome of
most politically sensitive cases as pro-LDP. Instead, he challenges our use of principalagent theory to attribute that pro-LDP bias to LDP politicians. He emphasizes the LDP
politicians’ lack of overt intervention and the institutional freedom of the Supreme
Court to control the lower courts as it wished.
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empirical studies using multivariate regressions, we examined the gist
of this system as it operated through the late 1980s. Here is what we
found.
First, the Secretariat favored judges from the most selective universities. Because these schools maintained the most selective entrance examinations, their graduates tended to be smarter and
harder-working than others. Not surprisingly, judges from these
schools tended to obtain the best jobs at the outset, to obtain better
posts over the course of their careers, and to climb the pay scale most
rapidly. Tokyo lawyers from elite schools also earn higher incomes
than other Tokyo lawyers, as we find in related research.
Second, the Secretariat favored the judges who passed the entrance examination to the LRTI most quickly. Within the contemporary bar, students who pass the exam on one of their first tries obtain
the coveted jobs at the highest-paying law firms. Lawyers who failed
the exam fewer times also earn higher incomes than other lawyers, as
we find in related research. Within the courts, those who passed the
exam early landed the best initial posts, obtained the more prestigious
jobs over the next several decades and climbed the pay scale most
quickly.
Third, judges who did well early in their careers tended to do well
later. Even if we control for other measures of performance, those
judges posted initially to the TDC continued to obtain better than average posts throughout their career. They obtained pay raises more
quickly as well.
Fourth, although the evidence is more haphazard, the judges who
published the most opinions tended to obtain better jobs. And last,
men seem to have climbed the pay scale more quickly than women.
In related research, we also find that male lawyers earn higher incomes than women.
3. Political Bias
This institutional structure creates an obvious potential for political bias. The Prime Minister appoints the Chief Justice. The Chief
Justice supervises the Secretary General, the Secretary General runs
the Secretariat, and the Secretariat decides which judges obtain the
best jobs and quickest raises. By appointing as Chief Justice men who
shared his preferences, the Prime Minister could inject a political bias
into the administration of the courts. Given mandatory retirement of
justices at age seventy, he might not have long to wait. As Table 2
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shows, Prime Minister Koizumi was able to appoint eight members of
the Supreme Court, a majority, within two years of taking office.
By basic principal-agent theory, whether the Prime Minister
overtly intervened in the courts is beside the point. The stereotypical
English lord did not need to remind a good butler what he wanted
done. Good butlers knew what their masters wanted and did it before
the master asked. Indeed, the master only cared about results and was
glad to delegate details to the butler. To be sure, if a Prime Minister
never intervened in the courts, that fact could indicate that he lacked
the power to do so. Yet in Japan, the institutional structure gave the
Prime Minister full power to choose a Chief Justice who would impose
the Prime Minister’s political preferences on the courts. If he never
intervened, that lack of intervention would more likely indicate that
his appointees in the courts knew what he wanted done and did it
without his needing to ask.
Granted, before 1993 the Prime Minister’s power over the courts
was indirect and slow. His was the power to appoint, not the power to
fire. In turn, the Chief Justice’s power was the power to promote or
withhold promotion, not the power to punish a wayward judge immediately. The LDP had long controlled the Parliament and expected to
continue to control it. Ultimately, indirect power was apparently
enough: overwhelmingly, the courts did promote the electoral interests of the LDP.
The leaders of the LDP were not ideologues trying to leave a legacy of social change and progressive legislation. They were politicians
who wanted to please voters and the business community, and a majority of voters and businesses wanted steady and continuing economic
growth. Toward that end, LDP leaders did not want courts that tried
to change society. If they wanted a new legal rule, as leaders of the
majority party they could implement a change through a statute.
They wanted courts that would administer the law efficiently and stay
out of the way. Staying out of the way included staying out of the way
of government policies, of course, rather than introducing awkward
questions of constitutionality.
Thus, the LDP wanted two things of the judges: to keep their political views out of their opinions and to refrain from invoking the
Constitution when doing so would offend the LDP. These considerations suggest that Japanese courts may not always have been politically
neutral on questions of constitutionality. To test that neutrality before
1993, we examined a series of politically charged disputes. Again using multivariate regressions, we consistently found that those lower-
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court judges who decided the cases in the way that LDP leaders
wanted tended to obtain better jobs in the decade after the decision
than those judges who flouted those preferences.
We also examined the careers of the several hundred judges who,
24
in the 1960s, joined the left-leaning Young Jurists League (YJL).
Judges who joined the League tended to suffer in their careers. All
else equal, they obtained less attractive positions than their peers.
Concomitantly, they earned pay raises more slowly than those peers.
B. Potential Change
1. The Chaos of 1993
The year 1993 was a bad one for the LDP. After dominating politics for nearly four decades, the LDP entered the 1990s facing a massive range of problems. Having championed enormously expensive
public-works projects for years, in 1988 it had imposed a national sales
tax that alienated a broad range of voters. Under pressure from the
United States, the LDP instituted trade and investment reforms that
threatened key party constituents. With the end of the Cold War, its
broadly capitalist constituency began to unravel. As rural Japanese
continued to migrate to the cities, the LDP’s agricultural base steadily
atrophied. Bribery scandals discredited several of its key leaders. And
the economy—after booming for years—spiraled into recession.
Within this crisis, old enemies within the party decided to settle
scores. Ichiro Ozawa, once a leading Prime Minister candidate, engineered a no-confidence vote, quit the LDP, and created a new party
around his faction. In the ensuing election, every member in Ozawa’s
faction won reelection, but the LDP captured only a minority of seats.
Several non-LDP parties then regrouped. They coalesced around
Ozawa and renegade-LDP politician Morihiro Hosokawa and threw
the LDP out of power. Yet Hosokawa could not break free of Ozawa’s
influence, and the coalition that had thrust him into power soon unraveled. Hosokawa governed only eight months, and his successor
(another ex-LDP politician) lasted barely two.
Maneuvering through the chaos, the Socialists struck a deal with
the LDP that catapulted their own leader, Tomiichi Murayama, into
the Prime Minister’s office. It was the Socialists’ first return to power
since Tetsu Katayama’s short-lived Socialist government in 1947—a re-
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We obtained the YJL roster from OSORUBEKI SAIBAN, supra note 13.
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turn that did not last. Like Hosokawa, Murayama suffered under behind-the-scenes control by experienced LDP politicians. He implemented little if any of the traditional Socialist agenda, and his party
lost its credibility. In the 1996 election the LDP regained sole control
of the government. Usually in coalition with smaller parties, the LDP
25
has held the Cabinet ever since.
2. The Potential for Change
Although the LDP eventually returned to power, it now faced a far
more uncertain future. In the days before 1993, LDP leaders had
faced an opposition fractured into several parties—most of which lay
far to the left of the median voter. The LDP’s loss in 1993 was due to
Ozawa’s defection, not to the power of the traditional opposition. After 1996, LDP leaders faced parties posing a much more serious electoral threat and would not regain an absolute majority in Parliament
until 2005. In turn, this forced the LDP to share power with coalition
partners, albeit partners small enough not to threaten their dominance within the coalitions.
We closed our previous studies of judicial incentives before the
1993 crisis. During its four decades in power, we concluded, the LDP
had stacked the Supreme Court with men who shared its policy preferences. These men had supervised the Secretariat, and the Secretariat had run a “tight ship.” Under its control, the courts had operated as a smoothly running, hierarchically structured, and internally
competitive organization. Competing for a finite set of career rewards
within this internal labor market, court employees (i.e., judges) had
worked hard and worked well. Largely, they had adjudicated disputes
(a) predictably, (b) expeditiously, and (c) in politically sensitive cases,
according to the policy preferences of the LDP.
At the time we began our work on the Japanese courts, too few
years had elapsed since 1993 for us to measure any change. Now,
however, the LDP has been back in power for nearly a decade. How
might the courts have changed? From 1993 to 1994, a coalition
dominated by former-LDP politicians ran the Cabinet, with but dubious hopes of long-term survival. From 1994 to 1996, a bizarre coalition of the biggest parties of the left and the right controlled the
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For a description of the events of 1993, see, for example, JACOB M.
SCHLESINGER, SHADOW SHOGUNS: THE RISE AND FALL OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR POLITICAL
MACHINE 264-73 (1997); Gary W Cox & Frances Rosenbluth, Anatomy of a Split: The Liberal Democrats of Japan, 14 ELECTORAL STUD. 355, 355-67 (1995).
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Cabinet. Since 1996, the LDP has returned to power—but to an obviously fragile power.
These vicissitudes potentially affected the courts along several dimensions. First, where a capitalist party had ruled for decades, a selfconsciously leftist party now briefly shared that control. All else held
equal, we would expect more leftist personnel decisions. If a liberal
Prime Minister replaces a conservative Prime Minister, we would expect him to appoint more liberal justices to the Supreme Court. Over
time, we might expect the new justices to promote more liberal judges
in the lower courts.
Second, where one party had ruled before 1993, from 1993 to
1996 coalitions ran the country. The presence of coalition governments muddies the potential influence of ideology. The Socialist Murayama may have wanted to shift the courts toward the left, but he
shared power with the LDP and the LDP held no such preferences.
Unfortunately for the empiricist, whether the government would now
change the direction of the courts depended on the deals the politicians cut, but politicians disclose few such deals.
Finally, where the ruling party had expected to continue in power
indefinitely before 1993, after 1993 no coalition or single-party government had such a high degree of confidence. We next discuss why
this matters.
3. The Importance of Expected Tenure
a. The Desire To Control
The politicians running Japan since 1993 have lacked any assurance that they can keep power indefinitely. In turn, those fragile
prospects have potentially affected both their desire to control the
courts and their ability to do so. Politicians stay in power by delivering
portfolios of policies and programs wanted by at least a plurality of
voters. To do so, they need agents who will loyally design and implement the policies and programs those constituents demand. Within
the executive branch, they appoint bureaucrats to the job. Within the
judicial branch, they appoint judges.
Politicians need judges who will loyally interpret and enforce the
promised policies and programs. Voters do not elect politicians to
appoint judges who do no work. Neither do they elect them to appoint judges who adjudicate cases without rhyme or reason, who take
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bribes, or who sabotage the policies and programs for which the
politicians were elected.
To be sure, some voters also have a “taste” for independent courts,
though they seem to want independent judges who do as they—the
voters—want. Yet independent judges can by definition do as they
please. They need not follow precedent. They can invalidate programs they do not like. They need not even work hard. Even voters
with a taste for an independent judiciary will not pay an unlimited
price for it.
Politicians and voters do benefit from independent judges, but
they benefit primarily when their party is out of power. When their rivals control the government, they gain from institutions that block
their rivals’ ability to deliver the agenda the majority of voters—but,
alas, not their people—want. Independent judges offer precisely that
obstacle. Indeed, by strategically interpreting statutes and constitutions, they may even implement the policies and programs of the outof-power politicians. Politicians who anticipate losing power will not
necessarily keep courts independent. Even they may decide that the
immediate gains that result from stacking the courts in their party’s
favor outweigh any future benefit from an independent judiciary that
would protect them after they lost power. But where a party with high
odds of staying in office has less incentive to keep courts independent,
at least a party facing low reelection probabilities might choose to insulate judges from political influence.
According to a theory made famous by William Landes and Richard Posner, even majority politicians and voters might benefit from
independent judges if they would otherwise be unable to keep their
27
commitments. Suppose, for example, that voters want to encourage
pharmaceutical companies to develop new drugs. To do so, judges
need to commit to honoring the patents they award rather than invalidating them after seeing the high prices the companies charge.
Independent judges help overcome this temptation to renege. If politicians care enough about the future, they thus may want to maintain
the independence of those judges who remind them of their com-
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By “judicial independence,” we refer to independence from the government, not
independence from private parties in a case. We know of no one who would justify
judges who take bribes from private parties.
27
See William A. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 879 (1975) (asserting that independent courts
at times “facilitate[] . . . the practice of interest-group politics” better than politicians).
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mitments. Through such independent judges, in short, they may preserve a reputation that makes their commitments valuable.
b. The Ability To Control
A party’s ability to stay in power will also affect its ability to control
the courts. A party that anticipates staying in power can afford to appoint sixty-four-year-old justices when the retirement age is seventy.
Because such justices face only six years in office, they will not significantly “grow in office” and change their political preferences. Because the party will still be in office when they retire, it will be able to
replace them with other “sound” appointees.
Less obviously, a party with long-term prospects will also be better
able to control the lower courts. Rational lower-court judges will
know that the party will probably stay in office for the foreseeable future. As a result, they will not expect the political criteria for promotion to change over time. They will not reason that a boldly anti-LDP
decision will, after an unhappy but short exile to the provincial prefecture of Tottori, earn them a High Court seat when the Left comes to
power. Not only will judges working under a party with long-term
prospects more readily conform, heterodox jurists will tend to selfselect out of judicial careers. If they share the political preferences of
the opposition, they will instead opt for careers in politics, at universities, or in private practice.
4. Observable Implications
What, then, might be the observable implications of the crisis of
1993? Might Hosokawa and Murayama have tried to shift the courts
to the left? Might they and the LDP Prime Ministers who followed
them have tried to weaken the ability of sitting cabinets to control the
courts? If they tried either approach, we would expect to observe the
following:
a. Younger Supreme Court Justices
Because the pre-1993 LDP could expect to stay in power, it appointed justices close enough to retirement not to change their politics while on the bench. If post-1993 politicians decided to extend
their influence into the future, they would have appointed younger
justices.
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b. More Justices from the Universities and the Bar
During the long years of LDP control, conservatives and the apolitical disproportionately self-selected into the bureaucracy and the
courts. Those with tastes to the left instead opted for careers in the
bar, in business, in politics, and in the universities. As a result, nonLDP prime ministers who wanted to control the courts would disproportionately have named justices from outside the bureaucracy and
the courts.
c. Changed Career Patterns Within the Lower Courts
Before 1993, the Secretariat ran the courts tightly and used that
control to favor judges who implemented LDP preferences in sensitive
cases. If post-1993 politicians hoped to use their control over the judiciary to implement different policies, they should have promoted
different judges. If they hoped instead to reduce a ruling party’s ability to manage the courts, they should have weakened Secretariat control more generally. In either case, the courts should exhibit largescale deviations from earlier career patterns.
C. Judicial Administration Since 1993
We divide the period after 1993 into two parts: the interregnum
of weak coalition governments from 1993 to 1996 and the LDP cabinets from 1996 to the present. We also divide the courts into two
parts: the Supreme Court, subject to quick turnover after 1993 because of the proximity of all the justices to retirement, and the lower
courts, where judges continued on their slow path to advancement
under the supervision of the Secretariat. The direct impact of any
changes would show up in the Supreme Court. The indirect impact
would show up in the lower courts, either at once (out of anticipation
of weaker control by a less pro-LDP Chief Justice in the future) or
more slowly (once a new Chief Justice began supervising the Secretariat).
1. Supreme Court Appointees
a. Age
Because they expect to lose power periodically, political parties in
the United States name relatively young justices to the Supreme
Court. So too did the Socialist Katayama in Japan in the 1940s. As
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Prime Minister when the new constitution took effect in 1947, Katayama had the chance to appoint all fifteen Supreme Court justices.
Just as one might expect from an American president, he appointed a
majority of justices under age sixty.
By contrast, before 1993, the LDP could expect to stay in power
indefinitely and had little reason to appoint justices who were young.
LDP leaders could afford to appoint the best-qualified candidates, regardless of age. Indeed, older candidates presented a distinct advantage. Younger justices can change over time and eventually enforce
political preferences quite different from those of the party that appointed them. Rather than risk ideological drift, the LDP coupled
mandatory retirement (at age seventy) with older appointees—
28
generally about age sixty-four.
After 1993, prime ministers continued to appoint Supreme Court
justices at about age sixty-four. Nominally independent Hosokawa
appointed his four justices at an average age of 64.8. At-leastnominally-Socialist Murayama appointed his five at a mean of 62.6.
Since returning to power, the LDP has kept the appointment age
29
largely unchanged.
b. Careers
If by virtue of its unbroken power the LDP had shaped the courts
in its image, men like Hosokawa and Murayama might have made a
break from the past and picked their justices from sources other than
the courts that the LDP had controlled for so many years. Table 1 superficially suggests such a break from the past. Earlier LDP prime
ministers had appointed over forty percent of their justices from the
judiciary. Hosokawa and Murayama each chose only one of their justices from the courts, and—significantly—the man Murayama picked,
30
Masao Fujii, had been a member of the leftist YJL in the 1960s.

28

See supra table 1.
See supra table 2.
30
That YJL members have tended to suffer in their careers does not mean they all
suffered. Fujii enjoyed a stellar career long before Murayama named him to the Supreme Court. Fujii joined the courts in 1957 at age twenty-four. By the time of the YJL
controversy in 1969, he was already in his second teaching stint at the LRTI. From
there, he would go to the Osaka District Court, the Osaka High Court, the Ministry of
Justice Civil Affairs Bureau, the Tokyo District Court, and the Tokyo High Court. In
fact, he became Chief Judge of the Osaka High Court (probably the third most prestigious post in the lower courts after the Secretary General of the Secretariat and the
Chief Judge of the Tokyo High Court) three months before Murayama took office.
29
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Curiously, however, Hosokawa and Murayama did not turn to the
obvious sources for the rest of the justices. They could have found
plenty of independents and Socialists in the bar and the universities.
Yet Hosokawa picked only one of his four justices from the bar, and
Murayama picked only two. Neither chose a law professor. Instead,
Hosokawa picked one justice from the Ministry of Justice (a prosecutor) and one from the Ministry of Labor, and Murayama picked one
from the Ministry of Justice (another prosecutor) and one from the
31
diplomatic corps.
The appearance of a break with the past is deceptive. Neither Hosokawa nor Murayama controlled the Cabinet long, and neither controlled it without coalition partners. Rather than try hard to reshape
the courts, they apparently retained the LDP practice of “reserving”
each Supreme Court seat for a particular “line.” Under this practice,
LDP prime ministers had replaced justices from the lower courts with
lower-court judges, former prosecutors with prosecutors, former lawyers with lawyers, and others with, well, “others.”
Appointed from the Fukuoka High Court in 1973, Justice Eriguchi
illustrates one of the “judge” lines. When Justice Eriguchi retired in
1980, the Prime Minister replaced him with Justice Terada of the Tokyo High Court. Terada retired in 1985, and the Prime Minister replaced him with Justice Oouchi, again from the Tokyo High Court. In
1992, Justice Oouchi was replaced by Justice Miyoshi (Tokyo High
Court), and he in turn by Justice Kanaya (Tokyo High Court) in 1997.
By contrast, Justice Amano, appointed in 1971, had been a Osaka
prosecutor. Within two days of Amano’s retirement in 1978, the
Prime Minister named Justice Yokoi of the Nagoya prosecutor’s office.
Yokoi retired in 1984, and was replaced by Justice Nagashima of the
same office. Four years later, he was succeeded by Justice Teika. Because Justice Teika had been a lower-court judge, the Amano-YokoiNagashima line now became a judicial line. When Prime Minister
Takeshita appointed the next justice three months later, however, he
named a man from the Tokyo prosecutor’s office. The LDP maintained similar lines for lawyers and “others” for such assorted figures

Note, however, that Fujii—unlike some YJL members—did promptly resign his membership in the organization when the controversy erupted in 1969.
31
Obviously, the LDP would have exercised at least as much control over the executive branch as over the courts. Japan has a civil service system, but, as with the
judges, tasks must be assigned and promotions granted, and the elected official at the
top of the ministry will choose civil service heads who have done a good job of managing their subordinates.
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as professors, diplomats, and bureaucrats. Hosokawa and Murayama
adhered to the custom too, apparently deciding that judicial reform
was not a high priority for their coalition governments.
2. The Lower Courts
To see what happened in the lower courts, we combine the methodology of our earlier studies with new data on the post-1993 era. In
these earlier studies, we examined three categories of variables that
determined judicial careers: rulings in individual cases that might interest the LDP, membership in a left-wing political organization, the
YJL, and nonpolitical variables such as quality of college degree and
32
the number of times a judge failed the LRTI entrance examination.
33
In this study, we focus on the last two categories.
a. Appointees
Since 1993, the Secretariat has continued to appoint annually
about the same number of new judges it appointed earlier. Over the
years, that number has fluctuated between roughly 70 and 110. The
34
ninety-four new judges of 1998 fit into that range comfortably. Although the 1998 judges on average did pass the LRTI exam more
quickly than their predecessors, this change just reflects a slight shift
in the score necessary to pass the exam and not necessarily any change
in the quality of the test-takers. Where the pass rate had stayed below
2% from 1974 to 1984, by 1996 (the year the Class of 1998 entered the
35
LRTI) it had risen to 2.9%.
The Secretariat did appoint more women in 1998 than in the past.
Where in earlier years it had taken one woman for every nine men, by
32

We estimate this from the age at which a judge entered the LRTI.
As noted earlier, we take the data on judicial careers from ZEN SAIBANKAN
KEIREKI SORAN, supra note 5, the data on YJL membership from OSORUBEKI SAIBAN,
supra note 13, and university affiliation for the class of 1998 from GAKUSHIKAI, KAIINSHI MEIROKU: HEISEI 10 NEN YO, supra note 13.
For the regressions below, we augmented the data by adding seventeen judges
from the classes of 1957 and 1959 to the class of 1958 and twenty-four judges from the
classes of 1966 and 1967 to the class of 1968, to increase the number of YJL members
in the sample. This is an example of “stratified sampling,” a technique commonly used
in statistics to increase the information content of the data.
34
See supra table 3, panel A.
35
Ministry of Justice Secretariat Personnel Section, Shiho shiken dai niji shiken shutsugansha su, gokakushasuto no suii [Trends in the Number of Applicants and Passers on the
Secondary Legal Exam], http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/051007-1/17syutu-gou2.html (last
visited Mar. 28, 2006).
33
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1998 it accepted one woman for every four. Rather than any shift in
Secretariat policy, however, the change probably reflects the larger
number of women pursuing legal careers (by 2004, 23.5% of the LRTI
36
class were women).
b. Initial Postings
For many years, the Secretariat has identified its most promising
recruits and named them to the TDC. In 1968, 33% of the University
of Tokyo graduates and 55% of the University of Kyoto graduates
started at the TDC, but only 7% of the graduates of other universities
did. In 1978 the Secretariat named 31% of the Tokyo and 27% of the
Kyoto graduates to the court, but only 15% of the rest.
At the same time, the Secretariat sent its least promising young
judges to the branch offices and summary courts. In 1968 and 1978,
only 1.5% of Tokyo and Kyoto graduates started in a branch office or
summary court; 9.1% of the graduates of other colleges did. Only
2.4% of the judges who flunked the LRTI exam four or fewer times
started at such courts; 23.3% of the rest did. By 1988, the Secretariat
had abandoned its policy of starting any judges at branch offices, perhaps having decided that the weaker judges had all the more need to
learn their trade from numerous and able senior colleagues.
The simplest way to compare career paths before and after 1993 is
to look one-by-one at the various characteristics of LRTI graduates
and see how a given characteristic relates to success. That is what
Panel A of Table 4 does. The “pre-1993” column looks at the first assignments of judges from the classes of 1958, 1968, 1978, and 1988.
The “post-1993” column looks at the first assignments of judges from
the class of 1998. The first row tells us that 30% of the University of
Tokyo graduates started at the TDC before 1993, but 63% did thereafter. The second row tells us that after 1993 more non-University of
Tokyo graduates started at the TDC too, but that the increase was
smaller. Apparently, when the Secretariat decided to increase the
number of judges it started at the TDC, it looked primarily to its Tokyo alumni for the additional appointees.

36

Ministry of Justice Secretariat Personnel Section, Heisei 17 nendo shiho shiken dai
niji shiken ronbunshiki shiken no kekka ni tsuite [Regarding the Results of the Secondary
Essay Legal Exam, 2005], http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/051007-1/17ron-soukatu.html
(last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
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Table 4: Initial Appointment to the Tokyo District Court
A. Fraction of Class Starting at Tokyo District Court

37

Pre-1993

Post-1993

U Tokyo graduates
Non-U Tokyo graduates

.30
.16

.63
.23

U Kyoto graduates
Non-U Kyoto graduates

.23
.18

†

Flunks < 5
Flunks > 4

.24
.10

.35
.19

Men
Women

.20
.09

.32
.24

B. Determinants of Starting at the Tokyo District Court
Cl-98 • U Tokyo

.288
(1.54)

-.034***
(3.17)

Cl-98 • Flunks

-.035
(1.48)

-.019
(0.23)

Cl-98 • Male

.226*
(1.73)

U Tokyo

.117**
(1.91)

U Kyoto

.022
(0.31)

Flunks

Male

N
Adjusted R2

424
.04

Judges who flunked the LRTI exam fewer times also had a greater
chance of starting at the TDC (24% if they flunked four or fewer
times; 10% if they flunked more than four times), but after 1993 more
judges started in Tokyo whether they had flunked the test seldom or
often. A greater fraction of men than women started at the TDC, and
here too the fraction of both increased over time.

37

See supra table 3.
The pre-1993 column details the first postings of the classes of 1958, 1968, 1978,
and 1988; the post-1993 column details the first postings of the class of 1998. Dependent variable = 1 if initial appointment is to the Tokyo District Court. The regression is
probit. The table gives the marginal effects calculated at the median, followed by the
2
absolute value of the z-statistic. The adjusted R is calculated for the analogous regression in OLS. Even for the classes of 1958 and 68, YJL membership did not affect initial
appointments.
† No U Kyoto graduates were in the class of 1998
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level

2006]

THE CASE FOR MANAGED JUDGES

1903

Looking thus at probabilities characteristic-by-characteristic is a
good way to start, but it has two deficiencies. First, it is hard to know
quite what to make of a given cluster of four numbers—male versus
female and pre-1993 versus post-1993. When the percentage of both
male and female judges starting in Tokyo rises, for example, what are
we to make of any change in the effect of being male? Formal statistical tests exist to answer that question, but they cannot address the second deficiency: when different characteristics are correlated with
each other, independent comparisons cannot tell us which is the true
cause of starting in Tokyo. If University of Tokyo graduates also are
less likely to have failed the LRTI exam many times, for example, both
characteristics may seem to result in a higher chance of being posted
38
to the TDC, even if only one is truly causal.
The regression method used in Panel B of Table 4 solves these
problems. Statistical regressions separate the effects of correlated potential causes and generate measures of the reliability of the different
effects. Table 4 uses a probit regression, the kind appropriate when
the dependent variable that we are trying to predict (in this case,
whether the Secretariat first posts a judge to the TDC) can only take
two values—here 1 if he starts at the TDC and 0 otherwise. We take as
our data set information on all judges hired in 1958, 1968, 1978, 1988,
and 1998. We then explore the impact on this posting of a judge’s
university affiliation (two variables equal to 1 if a judge attended either of the top two universities), the number of times he failed the
LRTI entrance examination (Flunks), and his or her sex (Female = 0;
Male = 1).
To explore whether the class starting in 1998 differs significantly
from the other classes, we interact these variables with (i.e., multiply
these variables by) a dummy variable (Cl-98) equal to 1 if a judge is a
member of the 1998 class and 0 otherwise. Thus, for a judge from the
class of 1968 whose value of Flunks was 6, his value of Cl-98•Flunks
would be 0 (0 x 6 = 0). The non-interacted variables give us the impact of the variable on an initial TDC posting for the population as a

38

For our database as a whole, University of Tokyo graduates flunked the LRTI a mean
of 3.21 times, University of Kyoto graduates flunked it a mean of 2.95 times, and the other
judges flunked it a mean of 4.51 times. In other research, we calculate similar figures for
practicing lawyers. In a random sample of 804 lawyers, we find that they failed the exam a
mean 6.6 times. University of Tokyo graduates (169 lawyers) flunked 5.2 times, and University of Kyoto graduates (72 lawyers) 5.2 times. See Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric
B. Rasmusen, The Industrial Organization of the Japanese Bar (Mar. 7, 2006) (unpublished
manuscript), http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/jpnbar.nakazato.ramseyer.rasmusen.pdf.
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whole. The interacted variables tell us whether the Secretariat treated
the 1998 class differently from the others.
The positive number of .117 on University of Tokyo affiliation indicates that judges who attended Tokyo were more likely than the
others to start at the TDC. The z-statistic of 1.91 indicates that the coefficient is greater than zero at nearly the 5% significance level, giving
us a moderate level of assurance that the effect did not result from coincidence. The marginal effect of .117 indicates that a Tokyo graduate is about 12% more likely than others to obtain this posting.
Similarly, the marginal effect of -.03 on Flunks indicates that each
year a judge flunks the LRTI exam reduces his or her chances of starting at the TDC by 3%. This effect is highly significant, at better than
the 1% significance level. The coefficients on sex and University of
Kyoto affiliation, however, are not significant. Thus, the smaller percentage of women relative to men starting at the TDC that we saw in
Panel A is not big enough, given the small starting number of female
judges, for us to conclude that sex actually mattered to initial appointment.
The interaction variables indicate that the Secretariat continues to
favor Tokyo graduates and those who pass the LRTI exam quickly.
The coefficient on the interacted Tokyo variable is positive, and that
on the interacted Flunk variable is negative—but the z-statistics are
1.48 (for Flunks) and 1.73 (for males). Those z-statistics are too low
for us to conclude that the Secretariat favored such judges more
strongly than before, but neither does it seem that they favored them
less strongly.
Note that the coefficient on the interacted sex variable is positive
and significant at the 10% level: the data do not tell us whether the
Secretariat favored men earlier (when there were few women), but by
1998 (when women made up 19% of the group) it significantly raised
its preference for men over women. This illustrates the value of the
regression technique. Panel A of Table 4 indicates that the percentage of women starting in the TDC rose from 9% pre-1993 to 24% post1993, a much bigger increase than for men. The regression, however,
tells us that it is only after 1993 that we can reliably conclude that the
Secretariat gave men a better initial posting than women.
Apparently, the Secretariat did not greatly change the way it allocated its initial appointments after 1993. The number of women did
increase enough for us to conclude that the Secretariat appointed
women less often to the TDC. Obviously, however, this does not show
any decreased conservatism.
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c. Methodological Observations
We will apply the method just described—first look at averages,
characteristic by characteristic, then at regressions—to various stages
of a judge’s career. In each case we will use regressions with interacted variables to compare the impact of different characteristics before and after 1993. For the first appointment in a judge’s career, the
post-1993 sample was the class of 1998. For judges 5-15 years out, it
will be the class of 1988; for those 15-25 years out, the class of 1978;
and for those 25-35 years out, the class of 1968.
Two variables we will use in the remainder of the regressions do
not appear in Table 4. Leftist judges created a massive controversy in
1969 when a conservative group published the YJL membership roster. Because they had stayed out of the public eye until then, YJL
membership did not affect the starting posts of the class of 1968. Because of the controversy that ensued, judges of later classes did not
39
join the League. For these reasons, we exclude YJL membership in
Table 4. Because no members of the 1998 class attended the University of Kyoto (we do not know why the courts recruit fewer judges
from the University of Kyoto than in the past), we also excluded an interacted Kyoto variable.
In the regressions to follow, we will use the “tobit” technique instead of “probit.” Probit is appropriate when the dependent variable
(TDC) can take only two values. Tobit is appropriate when the dependent variable (the percentage of a decade in a particular kind of
post) cannot be less than zero or greater than one hundred.
d. Early Intermediate Career (Years 5-15) Postings
i. Administrative Jobs
After starting its top recruits at the TDC, the Secretariat continues
to favor them through the early intermediate years (years 5-15) of
their careers. Take its decisions about whom to name to prestigious
40
administrative posts. Both before and after 1993, judges who started
in the TDC, who were graduates of the University of Tokyo, and who

39

So we have been told. As our YJL roster dates from 1969, it obviously would not
list any judges who joined after that date.
40
See infra table 5, panel A. Administrative posts include appointment as an instructor at the LRTI, at the Secretariat, or at the Ministry of Justice. A judge with “sokatsu” responsibilities is not included, on the ground that such a judge will still be
spending most of his time judging cases.
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were male spent more years in the prestigious administrative posts.
Most dramatically, those who started at the TDC spent 28% of their
decade 5-15 in administrative posts, compared to a mere 6% for other
judges.
Panel C of Table 5 uses regression analysis to explore which variables are truly significant determinants of administrative postings and
whether their importance changed over time. The dependent variable is thus the fraction of the decade covering the fifth to fifteenth
years of a judge’s career that a judge spent in administrative posts. As
independent variables, we include the variables in Table 4, along with
a dummy equal to 1 if the judge had been a member of the YJL in
1969 and a dummy equal to 1 if the judge started his career at the
TDC.
Because judges in the class of 1988 were at years 5-15 during 19932003, we also interact all variables with class of 1988 affiliation. As in
Table 4, these interacted variables let us test formally whether the Secretariat treated judges at this career stage differently during 19932003 than it had treated preceding “generations.” Because no member of the class of 1988 joined the YJL, we omit the interacted term of
that variable.
During the three decades from 1973 to 2003, the Secretariat significantly favored its TDC starters over their colleagues. The marginal
effect of .19 indicates that such judges spent nearly two extra years of
the decade with administrative responsibilities. The effect is statistically significant at better than the 1% level.
The Secretariat also favored men at this early intermediate stage
of their career. This effect is significant at the 1% level. The impact
of YJL membership is not statistically significant, consistent with YJL
members spending 9% of the decade and nonmembers 10% of the
41
decade in administrative posts. University affiliation and Flunks are
also not statistically significant. This is less surprising than it might
seem, because these variables do increase the chance of starting at the
42
TDC. Given the impact of the initial TDC appointment, Flunks and
university affiliation obviously do indirectly affect the 5-15 decade performance.

41
42

See infra table 5, panels A & C.
See supra table 4.
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Table 5: Years 5-15 Appointments
A. Fraction of Years 5-15 in Administrative Posts

43

Pre-1993

Post-1993

TDC Starters
Non-TDC Starters

.28
.06

.30
.08

U Tokyo graduates
Non-U Tokyo graduates

.16
.08

.20
.14

U Kyoto graduates
Non-U Kyoto graduates

.15
.10

†

Flunks < 5
Flunks > 4

.12
.06

.23
.06

Non-YJL Members
YJL Members

.10
.09

‡

Men
Women

.11
.03

.16
.10

Pre-1993

Post-1993

TDC Starters
Non-TDC Starters

.15
.35

.19
.28

U Tokyo graduates
Non-U Tokyo graduates

.24
.33

.29
.24

U Kyoto graduates
Non-U Kyoto graduates

.27
.31

†

Flunks < 5
Flunks > 4

.27
.39

.19
.31

Non-YJL Members
YJL Members

.30
.35

‡

Men
Women

.32
.19

.25
.20

B. Fraction of Years 5-15 in Branch Offices or Summary Courts

43

See supra table 3.
The pre-1993 column details the careers of the class of 1968 during 1973-1983 and
the class of 1978 during 1983-1993; the post-1993 column details the careers of the
class of 1988 during 1993-2003. The dependent variable gives the fraction of the time
during years 5-15 of a judge’s career that he spends in an administrative post (Panel C)
or branch offices or summary courts (Panel D). The regression is tobit. Panel C: Censoring: (179,58,2). Panel D: Censoring: (59,177,3). The table gives the marginal effects calculated at the median, followed by the absolute value of the z-statistic. The ad2
justed R is calculated for the analogous regression in OLS. No members of the class of
1988 were members of the YJL.
† Only one graduate.
‡ No YJL members were in this age bracket
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level
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Table 5 (cont’d): Years 5-15 Appointments
C. Determinants of Administrative Appointments
YJL
U Tokyo
U Kyoto
Flunks
Male
TDC Starters

n
Adjusted R2

-.026
(1.51)
.035
(1.21)
-.007
(0.27)
-.005
(1.44)
.046***
(2.70)
.191***
(3.49)

Cl-88 • U Tokyo

.009
(0.22)
Cl-88 • U Kyoto
.622**
(2.07)
Cl-88 • Flunks
-.012
(1.68)
Cl-88 • Male
.083
(1.23)
Cl-88 • TDC Starters -.005
(0.14)

239
.26

D. Determinants of Branch Office Appointments
YJL
U Tokyo
U Kyoto
Flunks
Male
TDC Starters

n
Adjusted R2

.101*
(2.02)
-.048
(1.13)
-.001
(0.02)
.024***
(5.51)
.142***
(2.77)
-.165***
(4.21)

Cl-88 • U Tokyo

.118
(1.39)
Cl-88 • U Kyoto
-.331***
(13.17)
Cl-88 • Flunks
.003
(0.35)
Cl-88 • Male
-.106*
(1.83)
Cl-88 • TDC Starters .084
(1.03)

239
.26

The interaction variables again indicate that little has changed
since 1993. The Secretariat now significantly favors Kyoto graduates
more than it did before. The most interesting change is that failing
the LRTI exam fewer times, a characteristic of little direct importance
to this part of a judge’s career before 1993, does have a noticeable, if
small, effect afterwards. A judge who flunked the LRTI exam one
more time than the median judge now spends 1.2% less of the decade
in an administrative post. The low significance levels on the other interacted variables show that the Secretariat has otherwise simply continued its practices from the past.
ii. Branch Offices
Panel B suggests that many of the same variables affect the fraction of the decade a judge spends in branch offices or summary courts
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(albeit in the opposite direction). Before 1993, judges who started at
the TDC, who graduated from either the University of Tokyo or the
University of Kyoto, who failed the LRTI exam fewer times, and who
avoided the YJL spent less time in these undesirable posts. Curiously,
the Panel also indicates that women spent less time there than men.
Other than the favoritism toward elite college students, it suggests that
these phenomena continued after 1993.
Because simple summary statistics are only suggestive, however, let
us turn to the regression results in Panel D. This Panel shows the result of a regression of the percentage of the 5-15 decade spent in
branch offices or summary courts. For these jobs, YJL membership is
significant–-on average a YJL member spent one more year than other
judges in a branch office during this period (the median judge in the
classes of 1958, 1968, or 1978 spent three years in branch offices during the 5-15 decade). Having flunked the LRTI exam more times is a
highly significant predictor of branch office posting, and a first posting in TDC is a significant negative predictor. The effect of the university variables, however, is insignificant. Interestingly enough, men
did indeed spend more time in branch offices than women (14.2%
more).
The interaction variables show two changes after 1993. First,
Kyoto graduates effectively did not go to branch offices (recall that
44
they also took administrative jobs more often). Second, the effect of
being male disappeared. The marginal effect of -.106 for class of 1988
males effectively neutralizes the marginal effect of .142 for males generally. Otherwise, the Secretariat largely continued its earlier practices.
e. Later Intermediate Career (Years 15-25) Postings
i. Administrative Jobs
In this phase of his career a judge will usually spend much more
time in administrative posts than before. Panel A of Table 6 shows
that pre-1993 judges who started in the TDC spent a full 61% of the
decade between their fifteenth and twenty-fifth years in administrative
posts. Even for the non-TDC judges, the figure was as high as 32%.
The averages in Panel A show few changes from before 1993 to after,
except that women seem to do much worse after 1993.

44

See supra table 5, panel D.
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The regression results, however, show that nothing changed after
45
1993: even the treatment of women remained unchanged. Other
things held equal, women spent less time in administrative posts before 1993 (two years less of the decade), and that phenomenon did
not thereafter change. Attending the Universities of Tokyo or Kyoto
and starting one’s career in the TDC helped one’s career, and being a
member of the YJL significantly hurt it—but both effects held true before and after 1993. For this phase of a judge’s career, nothing
changed after 1993: every one of the interaction variables is statistically insignificant.
ii. Branch Offices
Oddly enough, being a YJL member seems not to have affected
whether a judge spent time in a branch office during his later intermediate career. What did matter was (as with obtaining administrative jobs) whether he graduated from the Universities of Tokyo or
46
Kyoto and spent his first years at the TDC. Where a non-YJL judge
spent 18% of the decade in branch offices, the YJL member spent only
3% more. But where Tokyo graduates spent 11%, the others spent
twice as much time there. Where the Kyoto graduates spent 7%, the
others spent three times as much. Those who started at the TDC
spent 8% of the decade in branch offices, while the rest spent 21%.
And those who failed the LRTI exam fewer times spent fewer years in
branch offices.
The regressions in Table 6, Panel D, confirm the insignificance of
YJL membership on branch office postings at this stage of a judge’s
career. They also confirm both that elite university graduates spent
less time in branch offices before 1993, and that the Secretariat did
not significantly change that policy thereafter. They indicate that the
Secretariat favored TDC starters both before and after 1993, that any
preference for low-Flunk judges appeared significant only after 1993,
47
and that the effect of sex was insignificant.

45
46
47

See supra table 5, panel C.
See infra table 6, panel B.
See infra table 6, panel D.
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Table 6: Years 15-25 Appointments
A. Fraction of Years 15-25 in Administrative Posts

48

Pre-1993

Post-1993

TDC Starters
Non-TDC Starters

.61
.32

.62
.27

U Tokyo graduates
Non-U Tokyo graduates

.44
.33

.34
.32

U Kyoto graduates
Non-U Kyoto graduates

.56
.32

.55
.29

Flunks < 5
Flunks > 4

.40
.26

.37
.21

Non-YJL Members
YJL Members

.38
.30

†

Men
Women

.37
.31

.34
.08

B. Fraction of Years 15-25 in Branch Offices or Summary Courts

Pre-1993

Post-1993

TDC Starters
Non-TDC Starters

.08
.21

.04
.27

U Tokyo graduates
Non-U Tokyo graduates

.11
.22

.19
.22

U Kyoto graduates
Non-U Kyoto graduates

.07
.21

.14
.23

Flunks < 5
Flunks > 4

.16
.27

.16
.36

Non-YJL Members
YJL Members

.18
.21

†

Men
Women

.19
.15

.20
.44

48

See supra table 3.
The pre-1993 column details the careers of the class of 1958 during 1973-1983 and
the class of 1968 during 1983-1993; the post-1993 column details the careers of the
class of 1978 during 1993-2003. The dependent variable gives the fraction of the time
during years 15-25 of a judge’s career that he spends in an administrative position
(Panel C) or branch office or summary courts (Panel D). The regression is tobit.
Panel C: Censoring: (68,143,7). Panel D: Censoring: (116,100,2). The table gives
the marginal effects calculated at the median, followed by the absolute value of the
2
z-statistic. The adjusted R is calculated for the analogous regression in OLS.
No
members of the class of 1978 were members of the YJL.
† No YJL members were in this age bracket
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level
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Table 6 (cont’d): Years 15-25 Appointments
C. Determinants of Administrative Appointments
YJL
U Tokyo
U Kyoto
Flunks
Male
TDC Starter

n
Adjusted R2

-.114**
(2.58)
.119*
(1.87)
.237***
(3.14)
-.003
(0.39)
.197***
(3.25)
.210***
(2.84)

Cl-78 • U Tokyo

-.072
(0.73)
Cl-78 • U Kyoto
-.032
(0.27)
Cl-78 • Flunks
-.031
(1.57)
Cl-78 • Male
.055
(0.52)
Cl-78 • TDC Starter
.057
(0.46)

218
.21

D. Determinants of Branch Office Appointments
YJL
U Tokyo
U Kyoto
Flunks
Male
TDC Starter

n
Adjusted R2

.056
(1.07)
-.097***
(2.14)
-.145***
(3.24)
.011
(1.53)
.015
(0.21)
-.110**
(2.16)

Cl-78 • U Tokyo

.065
(0.52)
Cl-78 • U Kyoto
.173
(1.00)
Cl-78 • Flunks
.028*
(1.73)
Cl-78 • Male
-.091
(1.36)
Cl-78 • TDC Starter
-.139*
(1.84)

218
.13

f. Late Career (Years 25-35) Postings
i. Administrative Jobs
The last phase of a judge’s career is especially interesting for us
because the years after 1993 include the class of 1968, the last class to
contain YJL members. Judges in later classes have not yet reached this
stage of their careers. As a result, we here compare the class of 1958’s
late career (from 1983 to 1993) with the class of 1968’s (from 1993 to
2003).
The summary statistics in Panel A of Table 7 suggest that before
1993, most of our judge characteristics did not affect administrative
appointments. Judges who started in the TDC did no better than
those who did not. In this context at least, the effect of a good start
seems finally to have worn off. The effect of youthful indiscretion has
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not: YJL membership continues to show a substantial impact on administrative appointments. Those who joined the group decades ear49
lier were still spending 19% less time in administrative jobs.
The penalty on YJL membership continues post-1993, and the
other variables start showing an effect too. At least by the simple averages of Panel A, after 1993 judges who started at the TDC did better
than those who did not; University of Tokyo and University of Kyoto
graduates did better than the others; and those who passed the LRTI
exam quickly did better than those who failed repeatedly. Has the
Crisis of 1993 at last produced a change in judicial careers for those
judges senior enough to be in positions of power?
50
The regression results say no. In fact, very little has changed.
YJL membership continues to have a negative effect. The effect is significant, subtracting 1.75 years from a judge’s time in administrative
jobs. Crucially, the small and insignificant marginal effect of .028 for
the interaction variable shows that the adverse effect of YJL membership persists after 1993. Neither the brief stint under a Socialist Prime
Minister nor the LDP’s loss of its long-term lock on power helped
judges who had shown their left-wing leanings 25 years before. We
cannot say whether this was because of their actual membership or
because of the beliefs that induced them to become members. Whatever the reason, however, the once-actively-leftist judges were doing
worse than other judges in their late careers.
The other variables show little effect on administrative postings.
Although men seem to have done much better than women before
1993, the absence of more than two women in the 1958 class makes
the calculated coefficient unreliable. All other calculated effects are
insignificant before 1993. Only being a Kyoto graduate had a significant effect afterwards.

49
50

See infra table 7, panel A.
See infra table 7, panel C.
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51

Pre-1993

Post-1993

TDC Starters
Non-TDC Starters

.63
.63

.79
.49

U Tokyo graduates
Non-U Tokyo graduates

.60
.65

.61
.55

U Kyoto graduates
Non-U Kyoto graduates

.60
.65

.85
.53

Flunks < 5
Flunks > 4

.65
.58

.63
.37

Non-YJL Members
YJL Members

.69
.50

.60
.48

Men
Women

†

.57
.48

B. Fraction of Years 25-35 in Branch Offices or Summary Courts

Pre-1993

Post-1993

TDC Starters
Non-TDC Starters

.08
.06

.02
.19

U Tokyo graduates
Non-U Tokyo graduates

.05
.06

.09
.17

U Kyoto graduates
Non-U Kyoto graduates

.07
.06

.04
.16

Flunks < 5
Flunks > 4

.06
.04

.14
.16

Non-YJL Members
YJL Members

.04
.10

.12
.20

Men
Women

†

.14
.19

51

See supra table 3.
The pre-1993 column details the careers of the class of 1958 during 1983-1993; the
post-1993 column details the careers of the class of 1968 during 1993-2003. The dependent variable gives the fraction of the time during years 25-35 of a judge’s career
that he spends in an administrative post (Panel C) or branch office or summary courts
(Panel D). The regression is tobit. Panel C: Censoring: (17,84,33). Panel D: Censoring: (98,35,1). The table gives the marginal effects calculated at the median, followed
2
by the absolute value of the z-statistic. The adjusted R is calculated for the analogous
regression in OLS.
† Only two women were in this age bracket
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 1% level
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Table 7 (cont’d): Years 25-35 Appointments
C. Determinants of Administrative Appointments
YJL
U Tokyo
U Kyoto
Flunks
Male
TDC Starter

n
Adjusted R2

-.175*
(1.78)
-.086
(0.62)
-.124
(1.11)
-.027
(1.16)
.298**
(2.10)
-.028
(0.15)

Cl-68 • YJL

.028
(0.22)
Cl-68 • U Tokyo
.104
(0.69)
Cl-68 • U Kyoto
.283**
(2.21)
Cl-68 • Flunks
-.012
(0.47)
Cl-68 • Male
-.153
(1.20)
Cl-68 • TDC Starter
.178
(1.05)

134
.14

D. Determinants of Branch Office Appointments
YJL
U Tokyo
U Kyoto
Flunks
Male
TDC Starter

n
Adjusted R2

.102
(0.86)
-.064
(0.61)
-.001
(0.01)
-.001
(0.07)
-.296
(1.37)
.092
(0.44)

Cl-68 • YJL

-.000
(0.00)
Cl-68 • U Tokyo
-.017
(0.11)
Cl-68 • U Kyoto
-.088
(0.69)
Cl-68 • Flunks
.002
(0.07)
Cl-68 • Male
.141
(1.50)
Cl-68 • TDC Starter
-.170**
(1.96)

134
.10

ii. Branch Offices
Time spent in branch offices in a judge’s late career tells a similar
52
story, with two differences. First, although none of our judge characteristics predicts branch office time significantly before 1993, after
1993 a TDC start does. Having begun one’s career at the TDC does
reduce the amount of time a judge spends in branch offices 25 years
later. Apparently, the “good start” effect persists here, even if not with
administrative jobs. Second, YJL is as unimportant as the other vari-

52

See supra table 7, panels B & D.
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ables in predicting branch office time. YJL membership seems to have
reduced the rewards to a judge, but not increased the penalties.
g. Summary
A bewildering number of regressions, perhaps, but the analysis
does let us explore whether anything happened during the 1990s to
the various phases of a Japanese judge’s career. Several conclusions
emerge. First, merit—at least as measured by the quality of a judge’s
college, his or her first assignment, or the number of times he or she
failed the LRTI exam—has not diminished in importance. In some
contexts, such as branch office assignments in mid to late career,
meritocratic variables may have become even more important than
they were before 1993.
Second, men now do better than women. Paradoxically, however,
that phenomenon may just reflect the fact that too few women joined
the courts before the 1990s to measure the effect of sex reliably.
Third, the adverse effects of YJL membership continued even into the
1990s, long after the events of 1968. Whether because of the continued stigma of membership or, more likely, because youthful membership can signal leftwing sympathies that last a lifetime, YJL judges suffered lagging careers even thirty years later.
Although the LDP lost its dominance in 1993, that loss did not reduce the career pressures, political or meritocratic, on lower-court
judges. Instead, the Secretariat continued to administer the courts
much as it had done before. What was an earthquake in electoral
politics left the judges with much the same incentives they had earlier.
II. THE CASE FOR MANAGED JUDGES
What should we make of all this? Does the Japanese Constitution
need a drastic overhaul? Did it (and we Americans drafted it, after
all) create this mess? Or is it even a mess?
A. The Constraints
1. Japan
The Japanese Constitution did not generate this system. The
Constitutions of Japan and the United States do not treat the courts
very differently. Under both, Supreme Court justices are appointed
by the executive branch. They cannot be removed except by impeachment or, in Japan, through popular vote or upon reaching re-
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tirement age. Lower-court judges in Japan serve ten-year terms but, as
previously noted, the government almost always renews their terms.
The government can neither cut their pay, nor discipline them except
for gross misconduct. The court system is formally independent and
the Supreme Court has the last word on the law. All this is essentially
the same in both countries.
What differs is the internal structure of each country’s courts,
which neither country’s Constitution dictates. According to the Japanese constitution’s text, Japanese politicians could reorganize the
courts by statute and insulate them from even indirect political control. According to the American Constitution’s text, American politicians could reorganize the federal courts and rein in judges who opposed their wishes.
Let us begin with Japan. The only constitutional constraint on internal court structure appears in Article 80:
[ J ]udges of the inferior courts shall be appointed by the Cabinet from a
list of persons nominated by the Supreme Court. All such judges shall
hold office for a term of ten (10) years with privilege of reappointment,
provided that they shall be retired upon the attainment of the age as
53
fixed by law.

Article 80 does not mandate the system Japan has now. Granted,
it does require the Cabinet to obtain the consent of the existing Supreme Court for its lower-court nominees, instead of the consent of
the upper house, as in the United States. Yet giving the court that
veto increases the power of the courts rather than reduces it. The rest
of Article 80 does not cut the power and independence of the judiciary. If the Japanese parliament wanted to give judges life tenure, it
could change the statutory retirement age from 65 to 120. If it wanted
to end three-year rotations, it could mandate appointment to specific
courts in specific regions. These are matters of statutory and administrative, not constitutional, practice.
2. The United States
Perhaps more surprisingly, the U.S. Constitution’s text does not
prevent the United States from having a system like Japan’s. The
Constitution does not mandate federal circuits. By statute, Congress
could abolish federal circuits and empower the Chief Justice to decide
the location and court at which each federal judge would work. It

53

KENPŌ [Constitution] art. 80, para. 1.
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could allow the Chief Justice to run a personnel office that would preliminarily make that decision. And it could permit him to staff that
office with the judges he finds brightest and most trustworthy, serving
there at his pleasure. As in Japan, he could then transfer judges
whose rulings displeased him to places the judges did not want to live.
Even under the existing statutory framework, a president with a
loyal Chief Justice could use postings to punish a disagreeable judge.
Suppose the President appointed prominent University of Chicago
Professor I. Jones to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in downtown Chicago, conveniently near his home. Four years later, suppose
Jones started enjoining the successor President’s legislation. The new
54
President could not fire Jones or cut his pay. Neither could he disregard Jones’s injunctions (though he could appeal them). But if the
Chief Justice agreed, the President could find an overworked court
that needed more judges. Applying 28 U.S.C. § 291, the President
could then order Jones to show up “temporarily” for work in such
courts. Pinch-hitting Jones might have to move from Omaha to Tallahassee to Anchorage and back again.
If the President (like the LDP) controlled the legislative branch,
he could go further. Suppose he wanted to punish not just Jones but
the entire Seventh Circuit. He could merge it into the adjoining
Eighth (by amending 28 U.S.C. § 48). He could then require the Chicago judges to rotate through St. Louis, Kansas City, Omaha, and St.
Paul.
Does all this sound implausible? In fact, many of the statutes are
already in place. About half of the judges sitting in United States federal district courts are in a special class of judges created by the Federal Magistrate’s Act of 1968; they are appointed by other judges,
55
serve eight-year terms, and can be fired for poor performance. Even
Article III judges can find themselves reprimanded, certified as disabled, or stripped of their cases—all by the judicial administrative or56
ganization called the circuit judicial council.
54

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
See Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts, 39
VAL. U. L. REV. 661, 663 (2005) (describing the creation of magistrate judges).
56
Administrative Office Act, ch. 501, § 306, 53 Stat. 1223, 1224 (1939) (creating
circuit judicial councils); Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2)
(Supp. 2002) (“Action by the judicial council under paragraph (1)(C) may include . . .
ordering that, on a temporary basis for a time certain, no further cases be assigned to
the judge[,] . . . censuring or reprimanding such judge[,] . . . certifying disability of the
judge[, or] . . . requesting that the judge voluntarily retire . . . .”). A judge certified as
disabled can be replaced as if he had died and descends into an uncertain status “jun55
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Reprimands, however, seem to be uncommon, even if misbehavior
does occur. Professor Geyh reports:
Instances of judicial misconduct included judges who appointed relatives
as court officers or who heard cases litigated by relatives; judges who improperly refused to disqualify themselves; judges who were suspected of
corruption; judges who billed the government for questionable expenses; and judges who were accused of being excessively aggressive in
moving cases on their dockets. Instances of judicial inaction included
both judges who delayed decision-making and judges who took extended
57
vacations.
58

The leading case is Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Chandler’s “docket was backlogged, he had been named as a
defendant in civil and criminal cases, and he had been issued writs of
mandamus twice for failing to disqualify himself from hearing cases
59
where he had an alleged bias toward one of the parties.” The Judicial Council ordered that he be given no new cases and his existing
ones be taken away from him. He filed a motion with the Supreme
Court, but the Court ducked the issue of constitutionality and rejected
the motion on procedural grounds. Even here, however, the judge’s
punishment was merely embarrassing publicity and a reduction in his
workload. American judges do not have significant power over other
Article III judges, but that is a matter of statute and custom, not the
Constitution.
The basis for the Japanese approach thus does not lie in the constitutional text. It lies in statute, and in the competitive internal labor
market that statutes create. Given the electoral markets in which
Japanese legislators must compete to survive, it lies in the preferences
voters hold.

ior in commission to the other judges of the circuit.” 28 U.S.C. § 372(b) (2000). Between six and thirteen judges—poor records are kept—had been certified as disabled
as of 1993. Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 243, 275 (1993).
57
Geyh, supra note 56, at 263-64 (footnotes omitted). Geyh describes a sample of
complaints and their results, as do Professors Barr and Willging. Jeffrey N. Barr &
Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self-Regulation, Accountability, and Judicial Independence
Under the Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 49-51
(1993).
58
398 U.S. 74 (1970).
59
Geyh, supra note 56, at 269.
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B. The Alternating Parties Theory of Judicial Independence
If the texts of the constitutions do not dictate the different judicial
systems, why then do the Japanese and U.S. courts operate so differently? Put differently, why do Japanese and U.S. voters choose such
different court systems? In an earlier work we proposed an alternat60
ing parties theory of judicial independence. Consider an incumbent
political party that must decide whether to “manage” its judges or
keep them “independent.” Ignore, for the present, considerations of
61
efficiency in everyday law. Look instead at politically charged cases
like election law and reapportionment disappointments.
In these politically charged cases, suppose the incumbent party
prefers managed judges. We represent this preference in Table 8 with
a payoff of ten from managed judges and eight from independent and
unbiased ones. The opposition party prefers the independent and
unbiased judges, which we represent by a payoff of six compared to
zero for managed judges. The particular numbers merely indicate the
ordering of preferences rather than size, except for the following crucial point: the sum of the parties’ payoffs is greater when judges are
independent and unbiased. We postulate this because both parties
value predictable decisions that follow the legal text and unbiased decisions promote such qualities.
If the Table 8 parties play the game as a one-shot game, then the
incumbent will choose managed judges regardless of whether that
hurts his opponent more than it helps the incumbent. In the oneshot version, efficiency yields to self-interest. If the parties repeat the
game indefinitely, however, matters potentially change. Suppose they
hold an election every four years and with each election the opposition party obtains a chance to become the new incumbent and itself
use the judiciary selfishly. If the incumbent enjoys very high odds of
winning the next election—more than a three-in-four chance, using
our example’s numbers—nothing changes.

60

RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 4, at 122. For other recent examples of the
theory, see generally TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003); F. Andrew Hanssen, Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 712 (2004); Lee Epstein, Jack
Knight & Olga Shvetsova, Selecting Selection Systems, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 191 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry
Friedman eds., 2002).
61
See infra Part II.D.
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Table 8: The Alternating Parties Theory
Opposition
Managed Judges

Incumbent

(10, 0)

Independent and Unbiased Judges

(8, 6)

Independent but Biased Judges

(5, 5)

Matters do change if the opposition obtains a serious chance of
winning the next election. Suppose the bias to the decisions by managed judges do not deny the opposition that chance. Two possible
equilibria now emerge. First, each party may choose to manage the
judges when it is in power, knowing that the other party will not later
reward any forbearance with its own forbearance. This inefficient
equilibrium will then become a self-fulfilling expectation. If each
party has a fifty percent chance of winning an election, this will yield
an average payoff of five to each party (fifty percent times ten plus fifty
percent times zero).
Second, each party may choose independent and unbiased judges
while in power, in the belief that if it leaves the courts alone the other
party will as well. This efficient equilibrium can also generate selffulfilling beliefs. Each party’s average payoff will now be seven (fifty
percent times eight plus fifty percent times six), which is higher than
62
the average payoff of five in the inefficient equilibrium.
Turn now to the possibility of independent but biased judges:
judges who feel free to decide cases against the incumbent, but who
do so according to their own political preferences rather than the law.
They would produce politicized law rather than efficient law—
amounting to what (referring to the current U.S. Supreme Court)
Richard Posner characterized as “essentially personal, subjective, and
63
indeed arbitrary” opinions —but not necessarily opinions politicized
to help the incumbent. Rather, the outcome will be random politicization. Whether the incumbent wins his election law case or not will

62

If the payoffs are defined in terms of utility rather than money, as is standard in
game theory, then Table 8 already incorporates risk aversion. The reason a player prefers the 8/6 payoff combination to the 10/0 is simply that an average payoff of 7 is better than an average payoff of 5.
63
Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 56 (2005).
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depend on sheer luck. Because half of the decisions will favor each
party and all outcomes will generate poor law, we assign expected
payoffs of five to both the incumbent and the opposition. If the two
parties expect to alternate in incumbency and opposition, they are indifferent between managed judges and independent judges, because
both yield expected payoffs of five. They would prefer independent
unbiased judges, for expected payoffs of seven each. On the other
hand, if a party expects to be in power enough of the time, it would
prefer managed judges—with a payoff of ten whenever it is in power—
to independent biased judges. Thus, a system of independent but biased judges is never optimal. We nevertheless raise the possibility to
emphasize that judicial independence does not remove politicization
from the judiciary and, in fact, can make things worse.
Consider now the United States and pre-1993 Japan. Competition
for control of the federal executive branch of the United States is vigorous and the Democratic and Republican parties alternate in power.
Federal judges are independent, and—when politically biased—biased
in both directions in ways that largely track the biases of the presidents who appointed them. In Japan through 1993, on the other
hand, the LDP was secure in power. As the incumbent party in Table
8, it preferred a system of managed judges and that is the system that
continued throughout its years in power.
C. Japan After 1993
Why then did things not change in Japan after 1993? Once the
LDP lost its traditional high probability of victory in every election,
does not our alternating parties theory suggest that it would choose a
more independent court system? Would the LDP not expect that it
could best promote its future interests if it disabled the Supreme
Court and Secretariat from interfering with the careers of lower-court
judges? After all, if the LDP continued to maintain political and
“managed” courts, its rivals would likely intervene equally politically
whenever they came to power. Yet when the LDP returned to power,
the age and background of the Supreme Court justices did not
change. Neither did the career patterns in the lower courts.
The lack of change in the age and background of Supreme Court
justices from 1993 to 1996 is easy to explain. The multi-party coalition
of 1993 had “other fish to fry,” and did not bother trying to renovate
the court system it inherited. The LDP-Socialist coalition that followed was equally unstable and, locked in a coalition with the LDP,
was not likely to change radically the system the LDP had designed.
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Murayama did not break with the tradition of appointing an elderly
lower-court judge to a particular Supreme Court “line,” though he did
manage to find a YJL member who fit that description. After 1996,
however, the LDP appeared equally unwilling to abandon its system of
“managed” lower-court judges and its tradition of appointing Supreme Court justices close to retirement.
Perhaps the LDP—and the pro-LDP holdovers on the Supreme
Court—wanted to change to the efficient equilibrium of independent
and unbiased judges, but did not think they could change expectations. Remember, even with alternating parties, the inefficient equilibrium can continue as a set of self-fulfilling expectations; it is just
that the alternation makes a more efficient equilibrium potentially
self-fulfilling as well. Perhaps in 1996 the LDP thought that its successor would “manage” the courts politically no matter what strategy it
chose.
Or maybe our Table 8 alternating parties theory does not really
describe Japan. In the theory, we assume that the combined payoffs
of the opposition and the government are higher when judges are independent. This assumption could be false for at least three reasons.
First, the LDP did not need courts to be independent for people
to trust it to honor the terms of its legislation. Through its long track
record, by 1993 it had already built a solid reputation for keeping its
promises. Landes and Posner suggested that politicians establish independent courts not because they fear what would happen in elections, but because no one would otherwise believe the promises they
64
made their constituents. A government may establish a patent system, but inventors will not respond unless they think it will honor the
patent later. By creating independent courts that force the government to honor the patents, the government can make its promise to
inventors credible. The logic applies to all government promises,
from the promise not to take property without compensation, to the
promise to pay contractors for road projects.
The LDP, however, had less need for this kind of commitment
mechanism. It had long been in power. Unlike a new party, it had a
good track record for reliability in honoring deals, even if not for abstention from collecting the proceeds from such deals.
Second, in the Japanese system of “managed judges,” the judiciary
(even if not the judges) largely runs itself. Although politicians
choose Supreme Court justices in both the United States and Japan,
64

Landes & Posner, supra note 27, at 877-79.
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in neither can they fire the justices. In an extreme constitutional crisis—say, an executive who wants, Hitler-like, to grant himself dictatorial powers—we could expect both Supreme Courts to behave similarly (whether similarly well or similarly badly is hard to say). The
difference between the United States and Japanese judiciaries lies in
the lower courts.
In the “managed judges” system of Japan, the lower-court judges
lack independence. They are free of direct control by politicians, but
the Supreme Court and Secretariat control their careers. Although
the Secretariat must pick the judges from the small but talented pool
of people who have passed a difficult examination and chosen a judicial career, it can punish and neutralize dissident judges without overruling each of their decisions. Japan can avoid the outcome of independent but biased judges relatively easily: the Secretariat selects
judges for ability rather than interest in politics and suppresses any
lower-court judge who does develop a taste for making public policy.
At the same time, if the Secretariat—following the wishes of the voters
and the LDP—wants the lower-court judges to make public policy intelligently, filling gaps left by statutes, it can reward judges for their
policymaking ability. It is just that those judges may be punished if
they choose policies of which the Secretariat disapproves. Obviously,
this leaves little scope for the judge to indulge his personal political
tastes.
In the United States, however, the President and Senate pick
lower-court judges, and once picked, those judges enjoy secure jobs.
Although this enables the President to pick politically loyal judges, it
65
reduces his (or the Supreme Court’s) ability to control them. Thus,
the Supreme Court of Japan has more power over the lower courts
than the Supreme Court of the United States, even though it rarely
66
overturns statutes or enjoins the government.
Happy with such a system, perhaps the LDP decided that its best
strategy in the new competitive environment was to establish as an
equilibrium a self-perpetuating and largely independent judiciary---65

See Posner, supra note 63, at 62-63 (“[L]ife tenure on a fixed salary . . . , so that
there are neither carrots nor sticks, . . . is a temptation to irresponsibility . . . .”).
66
Recall that the United States Supreme Court only invalidated two federal statutes in its first seventy years. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180
(1803) (invalidating the Judiciary Act of 1789); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393, 452 (1857) (holding that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional);
see also William H. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 589 (2004)
(discussing the Marbury and Dred Scott cases). The Japanese Constitution of 1947 has
only been with us for fifty-nine years.
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“largely” because it wanted judges who exercised conservative inclinations. Granted, if it shifted to appointing justices at age fifty it could
reduce the ability of its successors to appoint new justices. It would
also, however, create a new tradition of radical change in the judiciary
of which those successors might take full advantage. And it would give
the youthful justices more years to change their conservative inclinations and decide that they liked making public policy. Regardless of
whether they became conservative activists or shifted to the left, the
transformation would reduce the power of the executive and legislative branches. Better, the LDP perhaps reasoned, to continue its tradition of appointing justices close to retirement age.
Third, the system of “managed judges” works. Independent
but biased judges create a mishmash of law attractive to neither the
incumbent nor the opposition. They do so in everyday cases as well as
electorally sensitive ones. Independent and unbiased judges make
more consistent law—but “managed judges” will be more consistent
even than independent and unbiased judges, as we will explain in the
next section.
D. The Benefits
Managed judges yield dramatic benefits for Japanese citizens. The
judges may favor the politics of their manager. But they also have a
strong incentive to perform. By placing them within a competitive internal labor market, the Japanese government has given them strong
incentives along two crucial dimensions: to work hard and to decide
similar cases similarly.
1. Rhetoric
If we miss the virtues of managed judges in the academy, we miss
them because we assume that with judicial independence, more is better than less. A little common sense goes a long way here. Judges are
government employees. They may have gold-plated educations. They
may be smart. They may be sophisticated. They may even be rich, in
comparison to postal workers. But, they are still government employees. And like all government employees—like all human beings—they
do more and better work if someone notices and rewards them for
their efforts.
Unfortunately, in the rhetoric with which we describe all matters
legal, we lose that simple truth. We speak of the legal “profession”
rather than the legal services industry. We speak of “access to justice”
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rather than of helping people win their quarrels. To referee these
quarrels, we hire (and pay from the public fisc) a specialized corps of
government workers called judges. But at least in the federal courts,
we neither supervise them nor give them incentives to work hard. Instead, we glorify their essential irresponsibility. As Henry Hart put it:
[T]he Court is predestined in the long run not only by the thrilling tradition of Anglo-American law but also by the hard facts of its position in
the structure of American institutions to be a voice of reason, charged
with the creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating and
developing impersonal and durable principles of constitutional
67
law . . . .

As with academic freedom for professors, judicial independence is
romantic and comfortable, but not a policy destined to encourage intense effort or strict accountability. Indeed, judges do not even have
to worry about having their opinions rejected for publication. We
would not therefore expect federal judges to operate as efficiently as,
for instance, civil-service administrators in the Department of Agriculture. They at least must compete for promotion, even if they need not
fear unemployment.
2. Results
In Japan, politicians do not insulate their judges. Instead, judges
who bring talent and energy to the job earn rewards. The (relatively)
dull and lazy fail to advance.
The results are impressive. Where the federal and state governments in the United States employ 27,000 judges and magistrates, the
Japanese government uses barely 3000 regular and summary court
68
judges. With half the American population, Japan makes do with
one-ninth the number of judges.
Even with this smaller number of judges, the Japanese judiciary
processes cases with the alacrity of many of the U.S. federal courts.
Overall, U.S. federal district courts decide about sixty-five percent of
their cases within a year, and eighty-five percent within two years.
Japanese courts decide fifty-five percent of cases within a year and sev-
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Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84,
99 (1959). Posner characterizes this sentence as “the famous purple passage” of Hart’s
foreword. Posner, supra note 63, at 72.
68
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (2005), available at
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos272.htm.
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enty-eight percent within two. This is slower than the federal courts
70
on average, but still close—and far ahead of many U.S. state court
71
systems.
Although the competitive labor market within the Japanese judiciary does induce judges to work hard and to work smart—the Secretariat does look at case management as one skill it wants to see in a
judge—the key to the spectacular performance of the national system
probably does not lie in judicial effort. We obviously speculate here,
and turn to issues beyond the scope of our data. But the key to the
Japanese judiciary’s success probably lies instead in uniformity—
particularly in the uniformity of the judicial output. When monitoring and evaluating its employees (i.e., judges), the Secretariat examines how hard the employees work. It apparently weighs docketclearance rates heavily (we have long wished we had the data for our
regressions), and that fact obviously affects how rapidly judges process
cases. Yet the Secretariat also examines output quality. Do judges follow precedent? Do they decide cases the same way other judges have
decided similar cases in the past?
By requiring judges to decide like cases alike, the Secretariat increases the predictability of the adjudicative process. In turn, that
predictability promotes settlement. Whether in the United States or
in Japan, litigation is expensive. As a result, worldwide, most disputants litigate a quarrel only if they cannot agree on the expected outcome of the litigation. More specifically, they litigate only if they each
72
are optimistic about the outcome.
Through its monitoring, the Secretariat reduces the variance in
the adjudicative process. And by doing so, it reduces the fraction of
disputes in which the parties estimate their chances in litigation optimistically. In turn, by reducing that incidence of mutual optimism, it
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See J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC AP140-41 tbl.6.1 (1999) (presenting data for 1994).
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Id.
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See COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT
CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2004, at 137-46 tbls.7-8 (2004), available at http://
www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2004_Files/SCCSTabl5-8.pdf (reporting the
caseloads of state trial courts broken down by type of action (Table 7) and jurisdiction
(Table 8)).
72
The point is well known. See, e.g., William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the
Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 99-101 (1971) (providing a litigation-settlement model);
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 418 (1973) (same).
PROACH

1928

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 154: 1879

increases the ability of the parties to settle their dispute and pocket
73
the fees they would otherwise pay their lawyers.
3. Politics
The “costs” of these managed judges are far lower than most
commentators claim. Although scholars typically focus on political
cases as the most interesting, few real-world cases raise political issues.
Notwithstanding our collective invocation of “justice,” “fairness,” and
“equity,” the vast majority of court cases in any modern society are
mundane in the extreme—typically, they are traffic accidents and
debt collection disputes. In consensual transactions such as debt contracts, however, the expected litigated outcome of a dispute necessarily generates offsetting ex ante adjustments to terms. Inaccurate court
assessments of expectation damages, for example, simply induce parties to include liquidated damage terms. As a result, even of these two
categories of cases, only traffic accidents raise any serious issues of
fairness.
What is more, even in those rare, politically sensitive cases, a Japanese-style monitoring system will usually just induce judges to deliver
the policies and programs that the electorate wants. In democratic
countries like Japan and the United States, politicians win office only
through highly competitive electoral markets. Necessarily, those who
do not deliver the portfolio of policies and programs demanded by a
plurality of the electorate seldom stay in power. When those plurality
politicians force their political “bias” on judges, they largely—with ex74
ceptions to be sure—just force their judges to deliver the same.
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See J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement
Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263, 290 (1989) (applying the litigation-settlement model to Japanese traffic-accident disputes).
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Commentators sometimes raise the need to protect “powerless” minorities. Yet
if the majority party in the legislature will not protect them, we see little reason to
think their appointees in court would do so either. Commentators routinely invoke
the civil rights cases won by the African American community. Most of these cases,
however, African Americans won only after they became a key component of the coalition behind the Democratic Party. African Americans did not obtain civil rights in
court because they were politically powerless. They only began winning civil rights
cases after they ceased to be powerless. See GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 160-62 (1991) (commenting on the weak
power of courts in civil-rights disputes); see also Paul Frymer, Acting When Elected Officials
Won’t: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions 1935-85, 97 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 483, 495 (2003) (arguing that the courts desegregated labor unions
when elected officials failed to act). Fryman’s article confirms, however, that court action only began to be effective after the late 1960s, when African American political
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CONCLUSIONS
In countries like Japan and the United States, everybody seems to
love judicial independence—as an abstract concept. Even the U.S.
Chief Justice and his colleagues laud its virtues. Were he to examine
the concept a little more closely, however, the Chief Justice’s enthusiasm might wane. Does he really want lower-court judges who are independent enough to flout his wishes to no consequence except the
occasional reversal—a reversal that leaves the judges no worse than if
they had towed the line in the first place? Might the Chief Justice not
prefer the power to transfer a troublesome (in his view, incompetent)
judge away from an important court to a divorce court in the hinterland?
To calm the Chief Justice’s conscience, we would note that giving
him the power to transfer a troublesome judge need not necessarily
reduce the independence of the judiciary. The power to transfer reduces the independence of individual lower-court judges, but it does
so by transferring power from lower-court judges to the Chief Justice.
On net, the transfer could even strengthen the judiciary as a whole,
since unity strengthens an organization. Not only would the judiciary
speak with one voice, but lower-court judges would have stronger incentives to work harder, and the most important posts would go to the
hardest-working and smartest judges. Actually, the posts would go
only to those judges willing to toe the Chief Justice’s line, but merit
would nonetheless play a key role in selection.
Japan has had such a judicial system, with much success. Despite
its constraints, the Japanese judiciary has attracted some of the best
and brightest university graduates. Indeed, perhaps it attracts those
graduates precisely because of its constraints. After all, the system
clearly and predictably rewards meritorious judges willing to put aside
their personal political preferences, and such rewards attract many
bright young minds. Nor need Japanese judges spend the first half of
their lives cultivating connections with politicians so as to enhance
their chances for appointment or election. All they must do—but do
throughout their career—is to work hard and pay attention to what
the Secretariat wants of them. The system may not attract people who
want to change the world, but it does attract those who are willing and

power had grown, and that attempts to give the EEOC more enforcement power were
opposed not only by southern members of Congress, but by civil rights lawyers who
preferred private enforcement.
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able to implement the law uniformly across the country as the Supreme Court wishes.
One reason this system has worked well in Japan was the comfortable but not dictatorial dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party
before 1993. With its long time horizon and ability to make law via
legislative enactment rather than court rulings, the LDP was willing to
control the courts with a light hand in most matters. There were exceptions such as election law and injunctions, but so long as the courts
stayed out of politics the LDP rarely made its impact felt in the courts.
After 1993, Japanese politics became more like those of other democratic countries, with the incumbent party never very confident
that it would win the next election. In theory, the LDP’s more tenuous hold on power might have led to Supreme Court justices being
appointed younger and serving longer terms. In theory, it might have
led to lower-court judges being more willing to buck the current Secretariat in the hopes that a future one might reward them. In practice, we find no evidence of either phenomenon. Rather, we see the
courts at all levels continuing much as they did before. Is this because
the Liberal Democratic Party, which has continued to be in power for
most of the years between 1993 and 2005 despite its shakier hold, likes
the political viewpoint of the current judiciary and would not mind
establishing a custom of leaving it as it has been in the past? Or is it
that the conventional wisdom of LDP insecurity after 1993 is not
shared by the LDP leaders, and they see their hold on power as
stronger than we do? We will not pretend to know more about Japanese politics than the leaders of the LDP, but we have made our guess
about what they believe; look back in ten years, readers, and tell us if
we were right.

